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M&A专题论文(12):资本结构(1)

金融经济学2018-11-06 16:39:53

12期

  • Deviation from the Target Capital Structure and Acquisition Choices 

  • Do Firms have Leverage Targets? Evidence from Acquisitions

  • Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure 

  • Financing and Takeovers 


1、Deviation from the Target Capital Structure and Acquisition Choices 

Journal of Financial Economics 102 (2011) 602–620 


Vahap B. UysalUniversity of Oklahoma 


Abstract

This study finds that managers take deviations from their target capital structures into account when planning and structuring acquisitions. Specifically, firms that are overleveraged relative to their target debt ratios are less likely to make acquisitions and are less likely to use cash in their offers. Furthermore, they acquire smaller targets and pay lower premiums. Managers of overleveraged firms also actively rebalance their capital structures when they anticipate a high likelihood of making an acquisition. Finally, they pursue the most value-enhancing acquisitions. Collectively, these findings improve understanding of how firms choose their capital structures and shed light on the interdependence of capital structure and investment decisions in the presence of financial frictions.


原文链接:http://t.cn/RuBqLUN



2、Do Firms have Leverage Targets? Evidence from Acquisitions

Journal of Financial Economics 93 (2009) 1–14 


Jarrad HarfordUniversity of Washington 

 Sandy KlasaUniversity of Arizona 

Nathan WalcottWashington State University 


Abstract

In the context of large acquisitions, we provide evidence on whether firms have target capital structures. We examine how deviations from these targets affect how bidders choose to finance acquisitions and how they adjust their capital structure following the acquisitions. We show that when a bidder's leverage is over its target level, it is less likely to finance the acquisition with debt and more likely to finance the acquisition with equity. Also, we find a positive association between the merger-induced changes in target and actual leverage, and we show that bidders incorporate more than two-thirds of the change to the merged firm's new target leverage. Following debt-financed acquisitions, managers actively move the firm back to its target leverage, reversing more than 75% of the acquisition's leverage effect within five years. Overall, our results are consistent with a model of capital structure that includes a target level and adjustment costs.


原文链接:http://t.cn/RuBqCtS



3、Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure 

Journal of Financid Economics 20 (1988) 55-86


Milton HarrisUniversity of Chicago

 Artur RavivNorthwestern University


Abstract

This paper explores the determinants of corporate takeover methods (proxy fights versus tender offers) and their outcomes and price effects. We focus on the effect of leverage on the takeover method and outcome. The model predicts, for example, that the target's stock price appreciates less following a successful proxy contest than in a successful tender offer. In addition, we obtain several other results on price effects and on the capital structure changes that accompany contests for corporate control. Some of our results are compared with the existing empirical evidence.


原文链接:http://t.cn/RuBqriL



4、Financing and Takeovers 

Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2008) 556–581 


Erwan MorellecUniversity of Lausanne

 Alexei ZhdanovGeorge Mason University 


Abstract

This paper analyzes the interaction between financial leverage and takeover activity. We develop a dynamic model of takeovers in which the financing strategies of bidding firms and the timing and terms of takeovers are jointly determined. In the paper, capital structure plays the role of a commitment device, and determines the outcome of the acquisition contest. We demonstrate that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in financing policies with endogenous leverage, bankruptcy, and takeover terms, in which the bidder with the lowest leverage wins the takeover contest. Based on the resulting equilibrium, the model generates a number of new predictions. In particular, the model predicts that the leverage of the winning bidder is below the industry average and that acquirers should lever up after the takeover consummation. The model also relates the dispersion in leverage ratios to various industry characteristics, such as cash flow volatility or bankruptcy costs.


原文链接:http://t.cn/RuB5c4y


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